The results of the April 16 referendum called by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan prompted a deluge of analyses in the Western media which, for the most part, painted him as ‘the great loser’. In Greece, the results were described as a ‘Pyrrhic victory’ which some analysts proclaimed the start of Turkey’s strategic decline.
But the Istanbul stock exchange’s reaction was quite different as it continued its climb of the last two months. The Turkish lira was equally unperturbed. Turkish business, in contrast to international analysts, seemed satisfied by the result; Erdoğan’s acceptance by this sector is the secret to his dominance.
The new dominant classes
It may sound funny today, but after the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) first victory in 2002, Erdoğan had been hailed as the radical politician who would smash the Kemalist establishment and usher in democracy. Western analysts fantasised about the Turkey’s ‘good’ Islam as a counterweight to Iran and parts of the Arab world. But the reality was always quite different. Turkey’s political Islam was never democratic nor, of course, anti-capitalist or anti-imperialist. Its emergence marked what we could call the ‘autocracy of the free market’. Contrary to what most people think, there is no inherent contradiction between free market capitalism and political authoritarianism. AKP’s rise buried once and for all the Kemalist economy with its strong public sector and extensive web of social control. The new Turkish capitalism would have more open markets alongside broader state authority.
But the Istanbul stock exchange’s reaction was quite different as it continued its climb of the last two months. The Turkish lira was equally unperturbed. Turkish business, in contrast to international analysts, seemed satisfied by the result; Erdoğan’s acceptance by this sector is the secret to his dominance.
The new dominant classes
It may sound funny today, but after the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) first victory in 2002, Erdoğan had been hailed as the radical politician who would smash the Kemalist establishment and usher in democracy. Western analysts fantasised about the Turkey’s ‘good’ Islam as a counterweight to Iran and parts of the Arab world. But the reality was always quite different. Turkey’s political Islam was never democratic nor, of course, anti-capitalist or anti-imperialist. Its emergence marked what we could call the ‘autocracy of the free market’. Contrary to what most people think, there is no inherent contradiction between free market capitalism and political authoritarianism. AKP’s rise buried once and for all the Kemalist economy with its strong public sector and extensive web of social control. The new Turkish capitalism would have more open markets alongside broader state authority.
